guiding their conduct at major public events is triply unfortunate. First, the police are put in an untenable situation when they are called upon to undertake complex and important tasks in a legal vacuum. Police are entitled to direction from the legislature. Second, from the perspective of legality, a crisis of principle arises. Because the legislature has not spoken, police officials are forced to make up their own guidelines as they go. Developed without legal authorization and secretly, without any form of public review, they lack the quality of law. Third, citizens are left in a legal limbo, their rights affected by police actions that cannot be measured against any publicly disclosed standard. Core rights of assembly, expression, and protest are all compromised. So too are the rights of businesses, homeowners, and ordinary citizens to go about their routine activities without interruption. If such infringements are indeed both necessary and constitutionally justifiable, they need, first, to be authorized by law.
For these reasons, Canadian provinces and territories should adopt some form of "Public Order Policing legislation." Such laws would authorize the creation of police exclusion zones, providing principled and explicit guidance to their proper extent and duration. Criteria could be established guiding who would be allowed admission to "secure" areas (workers, business owners, homeowners, emergency medical personnel, security officials, journalists, and others?), specifying decision-making processes, establishing principles of compensation for those who suffer financial injury as a result of the creation of security perimeters, setting out "notice" requirements, and so on. If entry to otherwise public space is to be permitted only following airport-style searches, then explicit statutory authorization would both give comfort to security officials and clarify the limits of their authority for citizens.
3 Attempts to side-step the issue by "deeming" public property to be private (e.g., property of the International Olympic Committee, 3 The Commission for Public Complaints against the RCMP recently ruled alcohol searches at public events to be improper Values and interests come into conflict where public order is at issue. One group's right to assembly necessarily interferes with another's freedoms. Speaking loosely, disturbance of the "peace" is to some degree a necessary incident of public protest. Even the most peaceable multitude can seem intimidating and noisy. The presence of crowds impedes access to public and private property, and the peaceable enjoyment of land or other property may be disrupted. Large gatherings obstruct passage, inhibiting, to a degree, the freedom of movement of others. Moreover, even the most law-abiding crowd can provide cover for hooligans, vandals, troublemakers, and individuals intent on criminal assault or worse. Important as they are, the rights of assembly, movement, and protest are not unqualified. They can -and should -be balanced against other important public needs. The balancing should be steered by law, directed by statute. The alternatives of chaos or unilateral police usurpation of powers that are not theirs are equally unpalatable.
Part 2: Limits of Public Order Policing Power in Canada
At large public gatherings, police commonly erect fences or barricades to channel the movement of people, close off entire areas of public space, and issue police passes allowing entry to selected individuals. Knowing that they lack statutory authority, Canadian policing officials have hoped, falsely, that such powers can be derived from the ancient duties of peace officers to protect life and property, preserve peace, and prevent crime. Their hope is unfounded as such an outcome would require an untenable extrapolation of a limited, though ancient, police power. generally followed the hotel's property lines but also obstructed a small portion of the sidewalk on an adjacent public street. E.J.N. Knowlton told police that he intended to walk along that portion of the sidewalk in order to take pictures and that he viewed the barricade as an unlawful interference with his right to move freely on a public street. Upon breaching the perimeter, he was arrested and charged with obstructing a peace officer.
Provincial Court Judge Rennie acquitted Knowlton, reasoning that, in the absence of statutory authority, the police could not so interfere with a law-abiding citizen: "[T]he police at the relevant time
were not enforcing any provisions of the Criminal Code, or any by-law or other law and … therefore they
were not acting in the execution of their duty…." 9 On appeal, a unanimous bench of the Supreme Court of Canada 10 agreed that police power does not float free of common law and statute. The court accepted that the police had interfered with the "liberty of the appellant," including his undoubted legal "right to circulate freely on a public street," 11 but upheld police action in the particular circumstances. The trial judge had not properly taken into account the ancient common law duty of "constables" to preserve the peace and to prevent crime, duties imported into the Canadian Criminal Code and into legislation governing police forces across Canada. The common law authority was explicitly extended to Alberta's police under section 3 of the Alberta Police Act (1971), 12 which stated that police had the power to "perform all duties that are assigned to police officers" in relation to preserving the peace, preventing crime, and apprehending offenders who may lawfully be taken into custody. 13 Given the earlier assault on the Soviet premier, the court thought it reasonable for police to seek to guard against further disturbance of the peace or criminal assault. In the particular circumstances, obstruction of a small stretch of sidewalk represented a reasonable instance of the general authority of constables to preserve the peace, prevent crime, protect public safety, preserve order, and prevent offences against provincial laws. The court also thought it proper for police to screen people passing through a security barricade, to selectively bar some individuals from entry to the private property within the barricade, and to issue "passes" for those who were able to satisfy police as to their backgrounds, intentions, and objectives.
Mr. Justice Fauteux's words do not offer virtual carte blanche to police officers to do whatever they want, provided only that they seek to preserve the peace and prevent crime. 21 Cloutier, para. 50.
the common law ("all duties that are assigned to peace officers in relation to the preservation of the peace") 22 but was not thoroughly analyzed in Tremblay.
23
The Security Offences Act, for its part, serves to delineate the boundary between federal and provincial jurisdiction in certain areas. It establishes the primacy of the federal government by assigning responsibility to the federal attorney general to "conduct proceedings" and "exercise all the powers and perform all the duties and functions assigned by or under the Criminal Code to the Attorney General" with respect to both security offences (as defined in the CSIS Act) and offences against "internationally protected persons" (IPPs). 24 Nothing here creates a new police power. On the contrary, the duties of RCMP officers are expressly said to be those of "peace officers."
When we turn to the Criminal Code, it is apparent that a profound misunderstanding of the phrase powers. Yet here we are dealing with the zoning of a large area of public space in Quebec City, not with a sliver of sidewalk adjacent to a privately owned hotel in Edmonton.
So enormous an extrapolation of the Knowlton principle cannot be good law. It bears noting that the Tremblay ruling emerged from less than optimal circumstances. Had Blanchet J. granted interlocutory relief, he would have dismantled security plans only days before a major international meeting that was certain to encounter massive protest. His lordship enjoyed neither the luxury of time nor the benefit of full argument and evidence. Although leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was refused, little can be read into this denial with respect to the court's view on the substantive matters.
The authority of police to create zones of exclusion either as an incident of the general and ancient duties of constables or under specific statutory authorization has never been established in the courts. The only case that comes close involves a ruling by a court of first instance, rendered in extraordinary circumstances and without the advantage of a full hearing.
The Peace Officer's Duty to Preserve the Peace and Prevent Crime 29 Tremblay, para. 102.
Tremblay cannot be taken to be good law. The ruling marks an enormous extension in scale from the virtually de minimus restrictions at issue in Knowlton. Whereas Knowlton involved exclusion primarily from private property and from a very small portion of an adjacent public street for a short period of time, the security zone in Tremblay was massive, circumscribed by a fence several kilometres long, encompassing an important urban centre, surrounding homes and businesses without the consent of property owners, blockading many public streets, and policed aggressively for a period of several days.
The measures taken in Knowlton had little impact on public rights of expression or assembly and minimal impact on the freedom of movement along public ways. Private property rights were not unilaterally violated in Knowlton as they were in Tremblay.
Moreover, Canadian constitutional history and practice point in other directions. The creation of large "no-go zones" by officials acting on their own initiative in the absence of explicit statutory authority tilts a long way toward an arbitrary system of government. The leading authority on ancillary police powers is Dedman v. The Queen. 32 That case deals with a
Charter challenge to random police stops carried out as part of an anti-impaired-driving program in
Ontario. Police would ask a driver for his or her licence and proof of insurance and, while doing so, take the opportunity to note the condition of the driver. The central issue before the court was whether police had the power to briefly detain randomly selected motorists. Ontario's Highway Traffic Act conferred authority to stop vehicles and inspect licences, and both the act and the Criminal Code authorized the taking of breath samples in proper circumstances. 33 The difficulty in Dedman arose because the stopcheck scheme rested on a ruse: the initial stops were random and the demand to see the licence merely a ploy designed to generate reasonable grounds to demand alcohol testing. In exercising a power given for one purpose, the police put it to an unauthorized use. The court was unanimous in finding that the powers granted could not be validly exercised for a purpose other than that specified in the act. The court concluded that the scheme of stop-checks was not authorized by statute. The majority of a divided court held that the scheme's interference with the qualified right of licensed drivers to "circulate in a motor vehicle on the public highway" 34 was permitted as a necessary extension of common law police powers in the particular context of traffic control.
35
In so concluding, the majority applied a modified version of the test of police powers set out in R. whether "a particular interference with liberty is an unjustifiable use of a power associated with a police duty." 37 The second stage of inquiry has three parts:
(1) The interference with liberty must be necessary for the carrying out of the particular police duty (2) and it must be reasonable, having regard to the nature of the liberty interfered with (3) and the importance of the public purpose served by the interference.
38
Mr. Justice Le Dain found in this case that "the seriousness of the problem of impaired driving" was sufficient to show the necessity of the program (stage 1) and to demonstrate the importance of the public purpose served by it (stage 3). Although stop-checks clearly interfered with liberty, the interference was short and the inconvenience caused "slight."
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In other cases, the Supreme Court of Canada has reviewed the general principles governing ancillary police powers in relation to wiretaps, police entry to residences, and searches upon arrest. As in Dedman, the approach of the court in each situation has been cautious, stopping far short of creating a sort of plenary police power to do anything that might reasonably be expected to protect property or life or to prevent crime.
In Reference re: Judicature Act (Alberta), s.27(1) (the "Wiretap Reference"), 40 the court had to decide whether Criminal Code provisions authorizing a wiretap also authorized police to enter private property to install the needed equipment. Mr. Justice Estey, for the majority, found that it did. As in Dedman, the ancillary police power in question was narrow and closely related to an elaborate statutory arrangement surrounding the particular interferences with liberty. personal property that, through no fault of their own, has become "part of a temporary crime scene," the question was whether police had the right to prevent the brothers from simply driving away.
Provincial Court Judge Allen considered the scope of the ancillary powers of police, in particular the common law duty to detect crime and bring offenders to justice. 46 Judge Allen concluded that the importance of a murder investigation, the possible forensic relevance of the particular vehicle, the temporary nature of the inconvenience, and the necessity of securing the crime scene in order to preserve evidence all led to the conclusion that the actions of the police were necessarily incidental to their general duty to apprehend offenders and prosecute crime. 47 This case resulted in recognition of a police "zoning" of sorts but one severely limited in space, time, and application. 48 The need here arises in a situation akin to an emergency that could not have been planned for in advance and in which no less intrusive options are available. The policing of well-anticipated public events bears no comparison.
In sum, in the absence of express statutory authority, the leading Canadian authorities on the ancillary police power provide no support for the proposition that police "zoning" of public space is an acceptable means of crowd control.
Statutory Authority for Public Order Policing?
46 Edwards, para. 36. 47 Edwards, para. 48. 1, s. 14) could be brought into play in some public policing contexts. Section 7.1(2), for example, permits the executive to "temporarily suspend the operation of a provision of a statute, regulation, rule, by-law or order of the Government of Ontario" and to "set out a replacement provision" during the period of the emergency. These extraordinary powers could, of course, only be lawfully deployed in truly extraordinary circumstances.
S. 19(1).
Sections 63 to 68 of the Criminal Code prohibit causing a disturbance or creating an unlawful assembly or a riot and give police specific powers in relation to those prohibitions. An unlawful assembly involves a common purpose that causes fear among others that the persons gathered may "disturb the peace tumultuously." A riot is "an unlawful assembly that has begun to disturb the peace tumultuously."
Section 67 allows a "justice, mayor or sheriff" or a deputy, when satisfied that a riot is in progress, to "command silence" and read a proclamation that commands participants "peaceably to depart … on the pain of being guilty of an offence for which, on conviction, they may be sentenced to imprisonment for life." Rarely used, 54 these provisions provide some evidence of what was considered justifiable in a free society in the decades before adoption of the Charter. Police are given authority to "disperse or arrest" individuals who do not comply with the section 67 proclamation, 55 licence to use as much force as is necessary and reasonable "to suppress a riot," 56 and immunity from civil or criminal proceedings arising "by reason of resistance." 57 Note, however, the relatively rare and particular circumstances that must obtain before these powers are authorized.
Property Rights and Protest
What of the rights of property owners -including municipalities and governments -to limit access to their property? The general rule, based on the tort of trespass, is that they may do as they wish with their land and that they enjoy an unconstrained right to prohibit access to individuals or groups. 58 Private property owners do not need to be concerned with balancing their desires against the countervailing interests of the wider community in the exercise of freedom of assembly, movement, or speech. The The appropriateness of attempts to regulate expression, assembly, or movement on government property has been considered by the courts on a number of occasions since. Incompatibility of function was held to permit staff to evict a protester from government offices at the end of the working day in R. v. In sum, public bodies do not enjoy the unfettered prerogatives of ownership of private property owners. Attempts by public authorities to restrict expression or assembly under the guise of "property management" will be subject to constitutional challenge. A high level of scrutiny attaches to spaces such as public parks, public streets, and sites that hold special symbolic meaning in relation to particular expressive activities. These are precisely the sorts of spaces that police will seek to "zone" during the assembly for a specific period of time, which may not exceed four days and five miles from the specified location.
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The New South Wales APEC Meeting (Police Powers) Act 2007 is more far-reaching in scope though limited in duration. It deals specifically with the creation of exclusion zones and the scope of police powers with respect to them. 79 The primary concepts of the act are those of the "APEC Security
Area" and the "APEC period," both defined terms, with detailed maps provided in a schedule. Police could exercise certain powers within the APEC Security Area, which included a "declared area" (the neighbourhood surrounding the buildings and sites at issue) and a "restricted area" (the buildings and sites themselves). The APEC period lasted only from August 30 to September 12, 2007.
The act authorized police to take a number of measures that would otherwise have been unlawful.
It permitted "check points, cordons or roadblocks" to stop vehicles or persons attempting to enter or move through the APEC Security Area and to conduct warrantless searches. Police could also seize anything on a list of "prohibited items," 80 including spray-paint cans, chains, flares, and other flammables. Without notice, police could also close roads in the Security Area, but for only the "shortest possible period" and for limited purposes, including the safety of persons travelling to meetings and the protection of property.
The act also created the offence of entering a "restricted area" without "special justification" (a defined term). This could include the need "to be in (or pass through) the area for the purposes of 
Conclusion
There is a clear need for legislation that would explicitly grant policing authorities the powers that they need in order to lawfully ensure the safety of the public during large public events. 82 The need for security measures to be taken in advance of these occasions is not open to serious question. But our analysis has shown that there is no foundation in Canadian law for the types of proactive and preventative commonsense policing that is increasingly common in events of this magnitude. Legislation is needed to fill the gap. Although their exact contours need to be mapped out through legislative processes, many of those powers will prove to be both unusual and intrusive. Without meaning to endorse the particular way in which a balance has been struck in either the United Kingdom or New South Wales, the examples set in those two jurisdictions point to both the necessity and the possibility of legislation that will address this gap in Canada. 82 The Access to Abortion Services Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 1, may serve as an important precedent for those drafting public order police law in British Columbia. Section 5 of the act gives the executive the power to establish an access zone around an abortion clinic "for the purpose of facilitating access to abortion services" and establishes a framework for the exercise of that power. The scheme withstood a challenge under section 2(b) of the Charter in R.
v. Spratt, 2008 BCCA 340.
